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A BRIEF RESPONSE TO RICHARD EPSTEIN
FRANK L MICHELMAN
Richard Epstein, from whom I have learned a lot over the years, is
persuasive about some things but not about everything. Here are some
things he is right about: Regulatory restrictions on the use of land
sometimes leave affected landowners considerably less well off than they
would have been without the restrictions. In many such cases, consider-
ations of fairness (certainly) and political-systemic prudence (maybe)
argue strongly for the payment of compensation. It would be good if we
could devise legal procedures for assuring compensation in those cases
-but, I would stipulate, in not too many others-where fairness and
prudence require it. Granted.
Now consider a legal rule that would require compensation at
taxpayer expense whenever the market value of any "portion" of land
would be increased by at least X percent by setting it free of a legal
restriction to which it is actually being subjected. "Whenever" means
whenever. It means any restriction that oversteps what is already implicit
in the common law of nuisance-a wilderness preservation law, civil
rights law, or workplace regulation law, for some examples. Is there any
persuasive public justification for enacting a rule of that kind? Would
it be a just, prudent, and otherwise defensible legal arrangement? Might
it perhaps be just another instance of pork-barrel legislation? Would it
be carefully matched to the problem of injustice, or would it in many
cases force lawmakers and regulators to a choice between either
foregoing responsible government or else handing-over public funds to
those who have no just claim to receive them?
Those and those alone were the questions to which my testimony
was directed. I was especially concerned with one line of claimed
justification for such a rigid, sweeping, and governmentally crippling
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rule: Namely, that it is demanded by an American constitutional
commitment to respect and protect private property. Implicit in that
claim, I said, is the premise that, "the freedom of owners to do with their
property whatever they choose (short of [committing a common-law
nuisance]) takes a clear precedence over [the govemment's responsibility]
... to identify and... defend important other interests of individuals
and the public."' Surely that premise is implicit, because without it
there is no basis for relief in every case where a "portion" of privately-
held land would be worth substantially more in the absence of public
regulation. And surely the premise is, as I said, "absolutist" as compared
with the view I uphold regarding the actual, historical American
constitutional understanding, which is, for better or for worse, that
private landholdings are broadly if not limitlessly liable to uncom-
pensated restriction in the public interest.
In support of my understanding of the actual historical "compact,"
I cited the judicial history culminating in Justice Scalia's recent opinion
for the Court in the Lucas case. Professor Epstein finds wanting in
rational defensibility the "per se" taking categories-permanent physical
occupation, total destruction of economic viability-that the Court has
apparently found it necessary to hatch in search of a regulatory-taking
doctrine that pays a decent respect to all the terms of the actual compact,
yet retains some semblance of justiciability or formal realizability. He
may well be right about this.2 Supposing he is right, then what follows?
Quite arguably, what follows is that the whole idea of a "regulatory
taking" should be altogether jettisoned from the judicial vocabulary.
Such might, at any rate, be the lesson drawn by those who maintain that
the judiciary ought not to intervene in affairs of government except on
the basis of clearly defined and decisive rules. To them, it may very
well seem that judicial vindication of justice and prudence in this
particular field is by now a provenly misbegotten venture on which
Justice Holmes and his brethren ought never to have launched the
country in the first place.3
1. Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. 34 (1995) (prepared
testimony of Frank I. Michelman, Harvard Law School Professor). A slightly edited
version of that testimony appears earlier in this issue. Frank I. Michelman, Testimony
Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. LAW 1 (1996). For convenience, we cite in this Response to Professor
Michelman's testimony as it appears in this issue.
2. On this point, he has excellent company to his left. See Margaret J. Radin, The
Liberal Conception of Property. Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
COLUM. L. Rv. 1667, 1674-84 (1988).
3. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393. 415 (1 99 t"rllfrpmld^
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